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Corporate governance, nance, and the real sector
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of the linkages between corporate governance, corporate nance and
the real sector of an economy. We examine a model of industry equilibrium with endogenous entry. We
show that poor corporate governance and low investor protection generates less competitive economies,
populated by rms with more insider ownership and greater leverage. The quality of the corporate gov-
ernance system can also a¤ect an economys industrial structure: better corporate governance promotes
the development of sectors more exposed to moral hazard, such as the high-technology industry. We
also show that entrepreneurs may have a preference for "extreme" corporate governance systems, where
the quality of corporate governance and the level of investor protection are either very high or very low.
This suggests that entrepreneurs operating in economies endowed with a corporate governance system
of low-quality may have little or no incentive to seek (or to lobby for) an improvement of the governance
system of their economy. Finally we show that nancial liberalizations facilitate rm entry and the
adoption of more productive technologies, promoting economic growth. Our stylized model generates
predictions that are consistent with several observed empirical regularities.
1. Introduction
What is the impact of corporate governance on the nancial and industrial structure of an
economy? Consider, for example, the case of Finland. During the past three decades the
Finnish nancial markets experienced a major shift from a bank-based nancial system, similar
to that in continental Europe and Japan, towards an Anglo-Saxon type nancial system based
primarily on securities markets. The stock market boomed, the banking sector consolidated and
the ownership structure of companies changed dramatically, as domestic institutions divested
their shareholdings, especially to foreign investors.1 In parallel, the industrial composition and
nancial structure of the economy also changed: earlier on, the Finnish economy was dominated
by highly levered companies, mostly related to the heavy metal and forest industry, whereas
today it is dominated by an equity nanced high-tech sector. Hyytinen, Kuosa, and Takalo
(2002) show that these shifts in corporate nancing and the real sector followed a major change
in the corporate governance regime of the country, and argue that the development of shareholder
protection was a major driver in this reorganization.2
More generally, the quality of a countrys corporate governance appears to be systematically
related to the degree of competitiveness of its economy and its industrial and nancial structure.3
In this paper, we present a theory of the linkages between corporate governance, corporate
nance and the real sector of an economy. By using a parsimonious model, we study the
relationships that emerge endogenously among the corporate governance system of an economy
and its industrial and nancial structure, and generate empirical predictions that are consistent
with several observed stylized facts.
We examine a model of industry equilibrium where entry by rms into an industry is endoge-
1See, e.g., Hyytinen, Kuosa, and Takalo (2002) and Karhunen and Keloharhu (2001).
2An example of the shift in industrial composition is that in the year 2000 the Finnish rms led domestically
nearly twice as many patent applications as in 1980, at a per capita rate that was the second highest in the
European Union. Today the country ranks as one of the most competitive and least corrupt countries in the
world, according to the rankings from World Economic Forum, IMD and Transparency International.
3 In Appendix I we provide empirical evidence showing that countries characterized by better corporate gov-
ernance and investor protection have a more accessible local equity market, a higher degree of competition, and
a more developed high-technology sector. In a similar spirit, Agrawal (2009) shows that product-market com-
petition in a certain US state increases after passage in that state of Blue Sky laws, a statue aimed at investor
protection at state level.
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nous. In our economy, rms (entrepreneurs) are endowed with technologies of di¤erent e¢ ciency,
with the more e¢ cient ones requiring less capital. Entrepreneurs have limited wealth and seek
nancing in competitive capital markets. In the product market there is free-entry in that all
entrepreneurs that obtain nancing can enter.4 Thus, the degree of competition is endogenous,
and is determined only by the ability of entrepreneurs to nance their rms.
The ability of entrepreneurs to nd nancing is limited by the presence of agency costs in
both the debt and the equity markets. We model the agency cost of equity as in Stulz (1990,
2005), and assume that a rms insiders may transform some of the cash-ow to equity (that is
the rms free cash ow, net of payments to creditors) as private benets. The private use of the
rms resources is ine¢ cient, making outside equity costly to the entrepreneur. We model the
agency cost of debt as a risk-shifting problem (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As it is typical
in the presence of moral hazard in the debt markets, rms must maintain a certain minimum
level of equity to mitigate the moral hazard problem, generating debt capacity.
We show that corporate governance concerns in the equity market interact in an essential way
with the moral hazard problem in the debt market, and jointly determine an economys industrial
and nancial structure. When rm insiders have a greater ability to appropriate corporate
resources (that is, when the agency costs of equity are more severe) debt becomes more desirable,
since it reduces the need of outside equity nancing. The ability to issue debt, however, is limited
by the moral hazard problem in the corporate debt market. Thus, the simultaneous presence
of the agency costs of debt and equity determines the overall ability of rms to raise capital,
and limits entry into potentially protable industries. Our model determines endogenously an
economys industry concentration and the nancial structure of rms as a function of economy-
wide factors, such as the overall quality of the corporate governance system, and sector-specic
factors, such as an industrys exposure to moral hazard.
We show that economies characterized by worse corporate governance are characterized by
greater industry concentration (in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales, 2003).5 In turn, greater
4The fact that nancing is a major barrier to entry is reected, e.g., in the OECD World Competitiveness
Report 2006-2007, which lists availability of nancing as one of the most important barriers a¤ecting business
competitiveness in several countries.
5Thus, the causality between the quality of an economys corporate governance and its degree of competition
may indeed run in the opposite way to the one suggested in traditional theory (see, for example, Alchian,
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industry concentration leads to greater industry prots, higher debt to equity ratios, more
insider ownership, and higher returns on assets. These results are a direct consequence of
endogeneity of industry concentration in our model: bad corporate governance reduces rms
ability to raise capital, which limits entry, increases industry prots and debt capacity, leading
to greater leverage and insider ownership. Thus, by endogenizing industry concentration, our
model establishes a novel link between the quality of the corporate governance system, ownership
structure, industry concentration, and leverage. These predictions help to explain the stylized
facts that emerge from cross countries studies such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) and (1998), Stulz (2005), among others.
We next show that corporate governance impacts also rmschoice of technology. This hap-
pens because bad corporate governance penalizes "equity intensive" technologies, i.e. industries
where risk substitution is possible, such as the high-tech sectors. This means that in countries
with poor corporate governance low-quality technologies may crowd out,in equilibrium, high-
quality technologies that are more exposed to the moral hazard problem. Thus, countries with
bad corporate governance systems may be trappedin an equilibrium in which their industries
are dominated by less protable and less e¢ cient rms.
We extend our results in several directions. First, we introduce competitive banks that, at a
cost, can reduce the extent of the moral hazard problem. In this way, entrepreneurs can obtain
funds also in cases where they would not be able to raise capital from individual investors. We
nd that more e¢ cient rms use direct nancing, while marginal (less e¢ cient) rms borrow
from banks.
Second, we examine the benets of convertible debt (and similar instruments produced by
nancial innovation) as tools to control moral hazard (as suggested in Green, 1984) and, thus,
potentially facilitating entry. Surprisingly, we nd that the agency costs of equity interact
with the moral hazard problem in a way that convertible debt may in fact increase, rather than
decrease, the insidersincentives to take risks, thus with no e¤ect on entry. This happens because
insiders can benet from conversion of convertible debt, since conversion (by eliminating debt)
increases the cash ow to equity and allows more fund diversion, inducing more risk taking
1950, and Stigler, 1958): poor corporate governance and investor protection may in fact lead to high industry
concentration.
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rather than discouraging it.
Third, we examine the incentives to improve the quality of the governance system both at
rm level and for the overall economy. We show that rms in industries more exposed to moral
hazard invest more to improve their corporate governance, generating a negative correlation
between the quality a rms governance system and its leverage. We then investigate entrepre-
neurspreference for good governance and, thus, their incentives to lobby for good governance
legislation in their economy.
We show that the quality of the corporate governance system has an ambiguous impact on
entrepreneurswelfare. On the one hand, entrepreneurs benet from good governance because
it reduces the cost of raising external equity; on the other hand, insiders are hurt by good
governance, because it facilitates entry exposing them to more competition. We show that
entrepreneurs may have a preference for extreme corporate governance regimes, that is for
regimes with either a very high or a very low corporate governance quality. This observation
suggests that entrepreneurs in economies characterized by bad corporate governance have little
incentive to lobby for an improvement of their corporate governance system. It also suggests
that countries would segment themselves into two groups, one with high-quality corporate
governance systems, and one with low-quality systems, with little transition from one group to
the other.
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of nancial market liberalizations on economic growth and
rmstechnology choices and preferences for governance. We show that nancial market liberal-
izations, facilitating equity nancing, induce more entry and the adoption of the more productive
high-quality (equity-intensive) technologies, promoting economic growth. In addition, we show
that liberalizations a¤ect preferences for good governance and can make entrepreneurs more
likely to benet from improvements in the corporate governance system of their economies.
Our paper rests at the intersection of several strands of literature. The rst one is the
rapidly emerging literature on corporate governance and its e¤ect on the real sector.6 By
explicitly endogenizing the market structure of an industry, our paper shows that corporate
governance and capital structure considerations interact in an essential way to determine the
6For excellent surveys of the literature, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and Vishny (2000), and Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2002).
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competitive conditions in the industry, in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (2003). Closely related
is also Stulz (2005), which argues that the agency cost of equity limits a rms ability to raise
capital and, therefore, to take advantage of the benets of globalization, and John and Kedia
(2003), who discuss the costs and benets of alternative corporate governance systems. Our
paper is also related to the growth and nance literature (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales,
1998, and Levine, 1997, for a comprehensive survey) in that better corporate governance can
increase an economys growth by facilitating rmscapital raising and the adoption of superior
technologies. Thus, our paper provides a new channel through which nancial liberalizations
a¤ect the real sector of an economy (see for example, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblatt, 2005,
and 2009, for empirical evidence on the e¤ect of nancial liberalizations on economic growth
and productivity).
The second strand of literature is the one on the interaction between nancial and market
structure (see e.g., Brander and Lewis, 1986, and Maksimovic, 1988, among others). These pa-
pers show that a rmss nancial structure can be used strategically to induce a more aggressive
behavior in the output market. In our paper, we rely on a di¤erent, non-strategic connection
between market structure and rmscapital structure. In this sense, our paper is close to Mak-
simovic and Zechner (1991) and Williams (1995), which focus on the e¤ects of agency costs on
intra-industry variation of technology choice and capital structure.7 The third strand of liter-
ature is the one on industrial organization and the determinants of market structure (see, for
example, Vives, 1999, among many others). Moreover, our paper extends in a (general) market
equilibrium setting earlier literature that examines the impact of capital market imperfections
on product market competition (see, for example, Poitevin, 1989, Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990,
and Suominen, 2004).
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our basic model. In section 3
we present the main results of the paper. In section 4, we discuss our models predictions. In
section 5, we study the e¤ect of corporate governance on the choice of technology. In section 6,
we examine the role of the banking sector and the role of nancial innovation. In section 7, we
examine entrepreneurspreferences for good governance. In section 8, we study the impact of
nancial liberalizations. Section 9 concludes the paper. All proofs are in Appendix II.
7See also Riordan (2003) for a discussion of this literature.
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2. The basic model
We examine an economy endowed with three types of agents: entrepreneurs, consumers and
a large number of small investors. Entrepreneurs, with no initial wealth, are endowed with
production technologies (described below). Production requires investment of capital, which en-
trepreneurs obtain from investors. Investors are endowed with one unit of cash each. Consumers
purchase the goods produced by the entrepreneurs, and are characterized by their demand func-
tions (described below). All agents are risk neutral.
Entrepreneurs, indexed by i, are distributed continuously over the real line, i 2 [0;1), and
have access to two di¤erent production technologies. Technologies, indexed by  2 fH;Lg,
di¤er by their production costs and produce goods that can be of either superioror inferior
quality. Goods of superior quality are valued more by customers and can be sold at a greater
price. The high-quality technology,  = H, produces always superior quality goods, but at a
greater cost. The low-quality technology,  = L, produces superior quality goods only with
probability , while with probability 1    it produces goods of inferior quality. Production is
subject to moral hazard in that an entrepreneurs choice of technology is unobservable to both
investors and customers.
The total cost of producing qi units of output with technology  by entrepreneur i is
C;i(q) = F;i + cqi; (2.1)
where c is the (constant) marginal cost and F;i the xed cost, with FH;i > FL;i  0. Thus,
the high-quality technology has greater xed cost.8 In addition, entrepreneurs di¤er by the
e¢ ciency of their technologies. We assume that more e¢ cient entrepreneurs have technologies
with lower xed costs: F;i = F + i, where  is a measure of the e¢ ciency di¤erences among
technologies. Thus, entrepreneurs with lower i are more e¢ cient.
If a rm has produced superior quality goods, it can sell its products to consumers in the




  pi + ep; (2.2)
8We can interpret the greater xed cost of high quality technologies as the additional R&D expenditures
required to produce goods with superior features, and thus of superiorquality.
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where  is a positive constant that reects the size of the market, n is the total number of rms
in the industry who produce superior quality goods, pi is rm is price, and ep the average price of
the superior quality goods in the market.9 This means that if the n most e¢ cient rms produce
superior quality goods, we have that ~p  1n
R n
0
pjdj. As customary in the case of monopolistic
competition, we assume that rms are small and therefore treat n as a continuous variable (but
we will still refer to n as indicating the number of rms). Note that the demand schedule (2.2)
is similar to that in monopolistic competition, where a rm takes the other rmsprices as given
and acts as a monopolist on the residual demand curve.10
We assume that, if the rms products are of inferior quality, consumers are willing to pay
only the marginal cost c for the goods, obliging the rm to set p = c. This implies that only
rms that produce superior quality goods can recover their xed costs. Furthermore, throughout
the paper we assume that  < FL=FH , which implies that the high-quality technology is more
e¢ cient than the low-quality one. Thus, the parameter  characterizes the severity of the moral
hazard problem: a greater value of  makes it more likely that a rm using the low-quality
technology produces superior quality goods, increasing its incentive to select such technology.
Since the value of the parameter  depends on the technologies availability to rms, which are
presumably similar to all rms in the same industry, we interpret  as representing the exposure
of a particular industry to moral hazard. We will initially assume that  is su¢ ciently small
(or FL su¢ ciently large) that the low-quality technology is not sustainable (i.e., protable) in
equilibrium:
Assumption A1:   c(where c is dened in the Proof of Proposition 1, Appendix II).
This assumption guarantees that all entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium the high-quality
technology. The case in which also the low-quality technology is protable (and thus sustainable)
to some rms is examined in Section 5.1.
Entrepreneurs obtain capital by issuing securities to investors. For simplicity, we restrict
9Note that the demand function (2.2) implies that, when pi = ep (which will hold in a symmetric equilibrium)
total industry demand, and thus output, is a constant and equal to . In Section 8, we will examine the case in
which total industry demand is a decreasing function of the average price ep even when pi = ep.
10See, for example, Fujita et al. (1999) and Ottavio et al. (2002). Our demand function is also similar to that
in Salop (1979), with the di¤erence that in his circular city model, epi is the average price of the two rms
located closest to i.
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the space of feasible contracts by assuming that rms can issue only debt and new equity.11 In
particular, rm i seeks to raise FH;i by selling to investors a fraction i 2 [0; 1] of its shares,
valued at Si(i), and zero coupon debt with a face value Bi and a market value Di.12 Financial
markets operate competitively, and all agents have access to a safe storage technology that o¤ers
zero return.
Outside investors are atomistic. After issuing equity, entrepreneurs maintain control of their
rms, which they manage in their own interest. Entrepreneurial control of rms generates a
conict with outside shareholders who are exposed to (partial) wealth expropriation from the
entrepreneur, who is the rms insider. We abstract from other sources of disagreement between
outside shareholders and insiders-managers (such as those due to di¤erences in risk-aversion, as
in John, Litov, and Yeung, 2007). In the spirit of Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Wolfenson
(2002) we model this agency cost of equity by assuming that entrepreneurs may divert to
themselves a fraction  of the residual cash ow of their rms, after debt is repaid.13 Thus, we
can interpret the parameter  as measuring the level of contractibility of the rms cash-ow to
equity and, in this way, representing the extent of the agency cost of equity.14
We assume that diversion of rms cash ow is ine¢ cient, and a unit of diverted cash ow
is worth only  < 1 to the entrepreneur (as in Pagano and Roell, 1998, Stulz, 2005, and
Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). We interpret the parameters  and  as characterizing the
quality of the corporate governance system and the level of investor protection of the economy
in that they determine how e¢ ciently entrepreneurs can divert their rmscash ow into private
11We rule out the possibility of addressing the moral hazard problem by the use of optimal contracts. While we
make this assumption for analytical tractability, our main results would hold as long as the moral hazard problem
generates an industry-specic debt capacity, even after accounting for optimal contracting. This assumption is
relaxed in Section 6.2, where we allow rms to address the risk-shifting problem by issuing convertible debt.
12Since, when A1 holds, the low-quality technology is not sustainable, entrepreneurs in equilibrium raise
FH;i = Si +Di units of cash from investors to cover their xed costs for the high-quality technology, FH;i.
13This implies that debt is a hard claim in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1995) and (1998). This means that
creditors rights are su¢ ciently strong to induce entrepreneurs to use all the available cash-ow to repay their
creditors before engaging in any cash-ow diversion. Our results will continue to hold as long as creditor rights
are stronger than shareholder rights.
14This means that, even if rm cash-ow is potentially observable by investors, only a fraction 1    is
contractible (see Hart and Moore, 1995, and Aghion and Tirole, 1992, where investors observe the state of the
world, but have limited contractibility).
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benets.15 For expositional simplicity, we assume that the xed cost FH is su¢ ciently large that,
in equilibrium, entrepreneurs equity retention is such that 1  i <  for all i. This assumption
implies that all entrepreneurs have an incentive to divert the fraction  of the cash ow to
equity.16
Assumption A2:   c (where c is dened in the Proof of Proposition 1, Appendix II).
The timing of events is as follows. At t = 0, entrepreneurs arrive to the capital market,
announce the target amounts of funds that they wish to raise by issuing equity and debt with
value Si and Di, respectively, in order to raise from investors the amount FH;i = Di + Si.
Investors make nancing o¤ers to the entrepreneurs. The capital market closes when n  0
rms have found nancing, the investors expect to break even, no entrepreneur wishes to change
its proposed nancial structure and no additional rm can raise su¢ cient nancing to enter.
At t = 1, all n  0 entrepreneurs that have been successful in raising FH;i of capital, i 2 [0; n],
select their production technology,  2 fH;Lg, and production takes place.
At t = 2, entrepreneurs pay back or default on their loans. Entrepreneurs divert to themselves
a fraction  of the cash-ow that is left after lenders have been repaid. The residual fraction
1   is distributed to shareholders. Investors and entrepreneurs consume their wealth.
An equilibrium in our model is characterized by the number of entrepreneurs entering the
market, n, and their optimal strategies, fpi ; i ; Si ; Di ; i ; Bi g, for i 2 [0; n], such that (a)
the strategy of each entrepreneur maximizes his payo¤ given the strategies of the other players,
(b) the goods markets clear, qi = xi, 8i, and (c) the rmscapital structure and the number
of entrepreneurs entering the market are such that no additional entry can occur with entrants
earning non-negative prots.
3. Equilibrium
We solve the model by backward induction. In period t = 1; entrepreneurs that have been
successful in raising FH;i units of cash, choose their pricing strategy depending on whether they
15Evidence of large benets of control and associated deadweight costs can be found in Albuquerque and
Schroth (2008).
16 If 1   i < , some inframarginal entrepreneurs (the more e¢ cient ones) would not, in equilibrium, divert
resources for themselves. Allowing for this possibility would not a¤ect our main results, however, because the
properties of our equilibria depend only on the behavior of the marginal entrepreneurs, for which i ' 1.
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have produced goods of superior or inferior quality. Taking as given the prices of the other rms
producing superior quality goods, fpjgj 6=i, an entrepreneur with superior quality goods faces a
residual demand curve (2.2) and maximizes his rms total cash ow, XTi , by selecting
pi 2 argmax
pi
XTi = (pi   c)

n
  pi + ep : (3.1)
If, instead, the entrepreneur has produced inferior quality goods, he has no choice other than
setting a price pi = c, at which it can sell a xed quantity, x.
The total cash ow accruing to a rm depends on whether it has produced goods of superior
or inferior quality, and therefore, on the choice of technology. Given the entrepreneursoptimal
pricing strategy, p, the total cash ow generated by rm i, XTi , is given by
XTi (p
;  i) =






+ I i (FH   FL) with pr: 1  I i (1  )
I i (FH   FL) with pr: I i (1  ) ;
(3.2)
where I i is an indicator function that takes the value of one if  i = L, and zero otherwise. Firm
is cash ow is divided between its creditors, XDi (p
;  i), outside shareholders, XSi (p
;  i), and
the entrepreneur, XEi (p
;  i), as follows
XDi (p
;  i)  minfBi;XTi (p;  i)g; (3.3)
XSi (p
;  i)  i(1  )maxfXTi (p;  i) Bi; 0g; (3.4)
XEi (p
;  i)  [ + (1  i)(1  )]maxfXTi (p;  i) Bi; 0g: (3.5)
Proceeding backward, at the beginning of period t = 1, after having obtained nancing, entre-
preneurs choose their technology by maximizing their own expected payo¤, selecting





;  i); (3.6)
where Et represents the expectation at t on future cash ows. As it will become apparent below,
the optimal choice of technology depends on the face value of the outstanding debt, Bi. The
optimal nancial structure is determined by entrepreneur i at t = 0 by maximizing
max
Si;Di;i;Bi
Vi = E0 X
E
i (p
; i (Bi)) (3.7)
10
subject to
Si  E0i(1  )maxfXTi (p; i (Bi)) Bi; 0g; (3.8)
Di  E0minfBi;XTi (p; i (Bi))g; (3.9)
Si +Di = FH;i; (3.10)
where (3.8) and (3.9) are, respectively, the shareholdersand debt holdersparticipation con-
straints, (3.10) is the entrepreneurs nancing constraint.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium): The number of entrepreneurs that enter the market in equilib-
rium, n, and their choice of nancing, fSi ; Di gn

i=0 is determined as follows:




FH + n + 
; (3.11)
where   (FH FL)1  . All i  n
 entrepreneurs choose the high-quality technology, and produce
output, qi , sold at a price, p









2) Entrepreneurs nance the xed costs, FH;i, by raising an amount of equity and debt equal to






   > 0; (3.14)




of their shares to outside investors. In equilibrium, the payo¤ to entrepreneur i 2 [0; n], V i , is
V i =  + (n
   i): (3.16)
Entry in the product market is determined by the interaction of imperfections in both the
debt and the equity market, captured by the parameters  and , as follows.17 Absent capital
17Note that  is strictly increasing in , and hence also measures an industrys exposure to the moral hazard
problem.
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market imperfections, that is, when  =  = 0, entrepreneurs can raise in the capital markets all
the funds necessary to nance protable projects. In this case, entry will occur until the rents





, are equal to
the xed costs of the marginal entrant. This means that, absent capital market imperfections,
the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs that enter the market, nc, is determined by condition
that the marginal entrepreneurs earn zero (expected) prots, that is, by 
nc
2
  FH   nc = 0: (3.17)
We refer to nc as the perfectly competitiveoutcome. From (3.11), it is easy to see nc > n
whenever  > 0.
The presence of imperfections in the capital markets reduces entry because it limits the
ability of entrepreneurs to raise capital on both the equity and the debt markets. Raising funds
by issuing equity is costly because the entrepreneur appropriates a fraction  of the residual
cash ow, after the repayment of debt, and he enjoys only a fraction  per dollar of diverted
cash ow, while the remainder 1  is dissipated. Since investors rationally anticipate the cash
ow diversions, entrepreneurs ultimately bear the cost of this ine¢ ciency, making outside equity
expensive for the entrepreneurs. This dead-weight loss represents the agency cost of equity.
The presence of the agency costs of equity makes entrepreneurs to prefer to raise as much
capital as possible in the debt market. The amount of funds that an entrepreneur can raise
in the debt market, however, is limited by the moral hazard problem. By choosing low-quality
technology (rather than the high-quality one) entrepreneurs save the amount FH   FL in xed
costs but, with probability , nevertheless obtain superior quality goods. Therefore the low-
quality technology is riskier than the high-quality one, exposing creditors to a risk shifting
problem.18 Since, given A1, the low-quality technology is not sustainable, entrepreneurs can in
equilibrium select a capital structure whereby they have an incentive to choose the high-quality
technology. Thus, the entrepreneur can only issue an amount of debt with face value Bi that







 Bi + FH   FL

: (3.18)
18Our results will hold also in the case that the high quality technology produces low quality goods with some










where D represents the rms debt capacity. Note that  (dened in Proposition 1) represents
the minimum equity value that a rm must maintain to ensure that the high-quality technology
is optimally chosen, and it depends on the severity of the moral hazard problem.
Debt capacity D is industry specic and depends both on the extent of the moral hazard
problem and on the level of industry concentration, n. Greater exposure to moral hazard
increases the minimum equity that a rm must maintain to induce insiders to choose the high-
quality technology, reducing debt capacity. Conversely, greater industry concentration raises a
rms economic prots, increasing its value and, thus, debt capacity.19
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs issue debt up to debt capacity, D, and then sell equity to
outside investors until i = 1, for the last entrant (i.e., the marginal entrepreneur). Given
that  represents the minimum equity that all rms must maintain to satisfy the incentive-
compatibility condition (3.18), and that the entrepreneur appropriates a fraction  of it, the
amount of equity that the marginal entrepreneur, n, issues is Sn = (1   ). Thus, the
marginal entrepreneur that can obtain nancing, n, is determined by




   = FH;n = FH + n: (3.20)




, after the diversion to the entrepreneur, , is equal to its xed costs, FH;n . Inframarginal
entrepreneurs issue to outside shareholders only the amount of equity that is strictly necessary
to raise FH;i, leading to (3.13). Since rmsequity has a market value EM  (1   ), the
fraction of equity sold by entrepreneur i is Si =E
M, giving (3.15). In equilibrium, the marginal
entrepreneur earns an economic prot which is equal to the value of the cash ow diversions,
. Inframarginal entrepreneurs benet from their greater e¢ ciency by issuing less equity, and
19Note that in our stylized model debt capacity is the same for all rms in the same industry since, from
the incentive compatibility conditions, the potential gain from deviating to low quality technology, FH   FL,
is independent of i. This assumption can be easily relaxed by assuming, for example, that more e¢ cient rms
have also lower variable costs, which would lead to greater debt capacity. Our main results will hold as long as
there is a systematic di¤erence in debt capacity across industries which is driven by heterogeneity in production
technologies.
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thus by earning, in equilibrium, greater economic prot, given by (3.16).
Finally, from (3.14), it is easy to see that, absent moral hazard (that is, with  = 0), all
rms would be entirely debt nanced and entry would occur until n = nc. Similarly, absent
the agency cost of equity (that is, with  = 0) all rms would have costless access to equity
and again, from (3.20), entry would occur until n = nc. It is precisely the interaction of the
imperfections in both the equity and debt markets, i.e. when  > 0, that limits the ability of
entrepreneurs to raise capital, reducing the equilibrium number of rms that can enter a new
market.
4. Corporate Governance, Finance, and Industry Concentration
Our model shows that industry concentration and rm nancial and ownership structures are
jointly determined by the interaction of the quality of the corporate governance system of an
economy (measured by ) and industry characteristics (that is, the exposure to the moral haz-
ard problem, measured by ). In this section we develop predictions on the cross sectional
variation that would be observed across industries within an economy (that is, in the same legal
jurisdiction), and across di¤erent countries with heterogenous legal jurisdictions.
Proposition 2 (Corporate governance, industry concentration and nancial structure): Economies
with worse corporate governance regimes are characterized by greater industry concentration,
greater debt level, lower book and market value of equity and, for the more e¢ cient entrepre-















> 0 i¤ i < ic(; ); (4.1)
where ic(; ) is dened in the Appendix. Furthermore, dening the elasticity of entry to corpo-
rate governance as "(n; j) =




Proposition 2 shows that the quality of corporate governance and investor protection a¤ect
several critical features of the industrial and nancial structure of an economy. First, economies
characterized by worse corporate governance (higher ) have greater industry concentration
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(lower n). This happens because worse corporate governance regimes limit entrepreneursability
to raise equity from capital markets, which impairs entry of new rms and, thus, increases
industry concentration. In addition, from (4.2), the elasticity of the number of rm entering
an industry in equilibrium, n, is increasing in that industrys exposure to the moral hazard
problem, . This means that the e¤ect of the quality of the corporate governance system on
entry is more pronounced precisely in those sectors where equity nancing is more critical.
Second, interestingly, low-quality corporate governance regimes lead to greater debt capacity.
This property is a direct consequence of the endogeneity of industry concentration: A worse cor-
porate governance regime, reducing entry, leads to greater industry concentration and, therefore,
to greater rmsprots in equilibrium. In turn, greater prots relax the incentive compatibility
constraint, (3.18), and increase debt capacity.
Third, worse corporate governance, increasing insiders cash ow diversions, reduces the
cash ow that can be pledged to outside investors and, thus, leads to lower book and the market
values of equity (given by Si and E
M
i , respectively). The e¤ect of the quality of corporate
governance on insider ownership, !i , depends on a rms position within an industry. Less
e¢ cient rms (greater i) rely relatively more on equity nancing. Worse corporate governance
implies that these rms must sell a relatively greater fraction of equity to outsiders, decreasing
insider ownership. Conversely, more e¢ cient rms, i < ic, sell less equity and, thus, rely
relatively more on debt nancing. This means that the increase in debt capacity that comes with
a worse corporate governance regime (as discussed above) allows these rms to issue relatively
less equity to outside investors, increasing insider ownership.
Proposition 3 (Moral hazard, industry concentration, and nancial structure): Sectors exposed
to more severe agency costs of debt are characterized by greater industry concentration, lower
















Industries exposed to a more severe moral hazard problem (greater ) are characterized
by greater concentration. This happens because greater exposure to moral hazard reduces a
rms debt capacity. Firms, however, can only partially o¤set the reduction in debt nancing
with a corresponding increase in equity. This happens because a reduction of a dollar in cash
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ow paid out to creditors results only in 1    dollars of added equity capacity (since a
fraction  of the rms cash ow is diverted by the entrepreneur). Therefore, worse moral
hazard impairs rmsoverall ability to raise funds, leading to less entry and greater industry
concentration. Furthermore, entrepreneurs in equilibrium substitute debt nancing with equity
nancing, leading to greater book and market value of equity and less insider ownership.
Propositions 1 - 3 generate predictions on the cross sectional variation that would be observed
within a country (that is, within the same legal jurisdiction), and across countries (that is, in
legal jurisdictions that have potentially di¤erent corporate governance and investor protection
regimes).20 We consider the e¤ect of the three parameters fi; ; g on several key ratios deter-
mined endogenously in the model. First, within an industry, for each individual rm i 2 [0; n]
we consider the debt-to-equity ratio, Di =S






degree of insider ownership, !i = 1  i ; and the return on assets: ROAi = Xi =FH;i. Second,
we compare these same key across industries and legal jurisdictions.21 Tables 1-a and 1-b below
present the sign of the partial derivatives of the ratios with respect to the relevant parameters.22
By contrasting tables 1-a and 1-b, it is easy to see that the correlation between leverage
and rm protability within an economy can di¤er when measured within the same industry or
across industries. In our model, rms in the same sector di¤er only by the e¢ ciency of their
technology, while rms in di¤erent sectors of an economy di¤er also by the severity of the moral
hazard problem and, therefore, by their debt capacity. Within a given sector, more e¢ cient
rms require less capital and need to issue less equity than more ine¢ cient ones. Thus, more
e¢ cient rms, have greater return on assets and issue relatively less equity, generating a positive
relationship between leverage and protability.23 Interestingly, this result is consistent with the
20Note that in our model, rms heterogeneity originates from three di¤erent sources. First, within a given
industry, rms di¤er by their level of e¢ ciency i, with more e¢ cient rms needing less capital. Second, across
industries in the same economy, di¤erent sectors have di¤erent exposure to the moral hazard problem, and thus
di¤erent values of : Third, across countries, di¤erent economies are characterized by di¤erent quality of their
corporate governance system, and therefore have di¤erent values of .
21For tractability, we consider the aggregate ratios for the industry, rather than the averages of the ratios for
all rms in the industry.
22The proofs are omitted, but they are available from the authors upon request.
23Note also that this result is robust to alternative specications of the source of heterogeneity within an
industry. For example, rms in the same industry may require the same xed assets, FH , but may di¤er by the
marginal costs, ci = c+ i. Even in this case, more protable rms would have greater debt capacity, generating
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nding in Mackay and Phillips (2005) that, within industries, new entrants (corresponding to
our marginal rms) have less leverage and are less protable than incumbent rms.
The relationship between protability and leverage is reversed when we compare across
sectors. Firms in sectors more exposed to moral hazard have lower debt capacity and leverage.
In addition, these industries are more concentrated and, therefore, are associated with greater
prots and return on assets. Thus, greater exposure to moral hazard leads at the same time to
less levered, more protable rms and to greater industry concentration, generating a negative
relationship between leverage and protability, and between leverage and industry concentration.








i   +    












   +   +  
 +   + +  
A plus (negative) sign indicates a positive (negative) partial derivative of the ratio or variable with respect to
i,  or ; respectively. Parameter i represents rm e¢ ciency, with a greater i corresponding to a less e¢ cient
rm; parameter  represents a technologys exposure to moral hazard, with a greater  corresponding to greater
moral hazard; parameter  represents the quality of a countrys corporate governance framework, with a greater
 corresponding to a lower level of investor protection and corporate governance quality.
The negative correlation between leverage and protability is a direct consequence of the
endogeneity of industry concentration of our model. This implies that a static trade-o¤ model
of the determination of a rms capital structure (such as the one discussed here) can generate
a negative correlation between leverage and protability. This result depends crucially on the
again a positive correlation between leverage and protability.
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negative correlation between debt capacity and protability that is generated by endogenous
entry.24
Across economies, our model predicts that economies characterized by worse corporate gov-
ernance systems (that is, by higher ) are also characterized by greater industry concentration,
higher debt to equity ratios (when equity is measured either at book or market value), greater in-
sidersownership, and greater returns on assets. These results are again the direct consequence
of the endogeneity of industry concentration and debt capacity: worse corporate governance
regimes reduce a rms ability to raise capital, which limits entry and, in turn, leads to greater
debt capacity (and, leverage) and greater insiders ownership. Thus, by endogenizing industry
concentration, our model establishes a novel link between the quality of the corporate governance
system, ownership structure, industry concentration, and leverage.
These results are consistent with several the stylized facts that emerge from cross countries
studies. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 and 1998) nd
that countries with worse corporate governance have more debt relative to equity nancing,
lower market values of rms (compared to GDP), and larger ownership by insiders. More
recently, Stulz (2005) nds that countries with worse corporate governance are characterized by
a smaller fraction of widely held rms and, thus, greater insidersownership. Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998) and Hail and Leuz (2006) nd that countries endowed with a better
legal environment are characterized by a lower return on capital. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan
(2004) documents the benecial e¤ect of regulation, that is aimed at a better development of
nancial markets, on the entry of new rms, especially in industries with high R&D intensity
or industries that have greater capital needs.25
A further implication of our paper is that the quality of the corporate governance system
of an economy has an independent impact on the nancial structure choices of rms, beyond
24 In this way, our model helps explaining the apparent puzzle given by the negative relationship between prof-
itability and leverage that is documented in several empirical studies such as Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan
and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1988), and Booth, Aivazian,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) among others.
25 In a similar vein, Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) documents a negative correlation between leverage and
the strength of a countrys legal system. The paper also shows that the presence of high-quality auditors (as
measured by the market share of the Big-ve accounting rms) is negatively related to leverage, especially in
developing countries.
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rm-specic characteristics. Thus our model provides an explanation for the ndings of Booth,
Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001), which shows that country specic factors
(such as its legal framework) are as important as rm-specic factors in determining a rms
capital structure decision.
5. Governance and Technology Choice
The quality of the corporate governance system a¤ects also rms choice of technology and
thus, through this second channel, the industrial structure of an economy. We investigate this
possibility in this section by considering the parameter region where Assumption A1 does not
hold, so that the low-quality technology is potentially protable. We maintain the assumption
that the high-quality technology is more e¢ cient that the low-quality one.
Proposition 4 (Corporate governance and technology choice): Let  2 (c; FL=FH) and  < 
(where  > 0 is dened Appendix II). In equilibrium n
0
> n entrepreneurs enter the market
and:
i) the rst n
00 2 (0; n0) of these choose the high-quality technology, and raise D of debt and
FH;i  D of equity;
ii) the remaining n0 n00 > 0 entrepreneurs choose the low-quality technology and nance their
xed costs entirely with debt by borrowing Di = FL + n
0: Here n00 (n0) is a decreasing
(increasing) function of :
In equilibrium, both low-quality and high-quality technology coexist when  < . Entre-
preneurs that choose the high-quality technology, i  n00 , issue rst debt up to debt capacity,
and then issue all the equity necessary to cover the xed costs, FH;i. Their number, n
00
, is
determined by the condition that the marginal entrepreneur is able to obtain nancing, that is

n00 + (n0   n00)
2
  (FH + n00)    0; (5.1)
and by the condition that he prefers to raise FH;n00 , and select the high-quality technology,




n00 + (n0   n00)
2
  (FH   FL)  (1  )  0: (5.2)
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Entrepreneursincentives to choose the high-quality technology rather than the low-quality one
can be seen by examining the three terms in (5.2). The rst term reects the fact that the
high-quality technology produces superior quality goods with certainty, while the low-quality
technology produces superior quality goods only with probability . The second term represents
the di¤erence in the xed costs of the two technologies, FH   FL. The third term represents
a governance cost, and is due to the fact that the high-quality technology can be adopted in
equilibrium only if the entrepreneur is nanced by equity in the amount of  (so that the incentive
compatibility condition is satised), while the low-quality technology can be nanced entirely
by debt. Since equity nancing generates an e¢ ciency loss, the adoption of the high-quality
technology is costly to the entrepreneur and leads to a loss of value equal to (1  ).
Entrepreneurs that choose the low-quality technology, that is i 2 (n00 ; n0], can nance their
xed cost FL;i entirely by debt. This happens because their investors are not exposed to moral
hazard, and the entrepreneurs optimally choose debt to avoid the dissipative cost of equity. The
number of entrepreneurs that enter the market with the low-quality technology is determined
by the condition that the marginal entrepreneur is just able to raise the xed cost FL;n0 .
The presence of the low-quality technology limits the ability of entrepreneurs to adopt the
high-quality one. From the nancing constraint (5.1) it is easy to see that, all else equal, an
increase of the number of low-quality rms that enter the market, that is a larger n0, has the
e¤ect of reducing the number of entrepreneurs with high-quality technology that can coexist
in equilibrium, n00. Conversely, a decrease of the number of high-quality rms that enter the
market, that is a smaller n00, has the e¤ect of increasing the number of entrepreneurs with
low-quality technology that can be sustained in equilibrium, n0. Thus, easier access to the
capital markets that facilitates entry by entrepreneurs adopting the low-quality technology (for
example, by improvements in credit markets, on which the low-quality technology is relatively
more dependent) displaces, in equilibrium, the high-quality technology.
An additional implication of Proposition 4 is that the number of rms that choose the high-
quality technology is lower in economies where the quality of the corporate governance system
is of worse quality. This happens because an increase in  makes the incentive constraint (5.2)
and the nancing constraint (5.1) tighter, leading to a lower n00. Similarly, sectors more exposed
to the moral hazard problem, that is, with a greater , are characterized by a smaller number of
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rms with high-quality technology. Interestingly, when the quality of the corporate governance
system is su¢ ciently low, it is quite possible that either (5.1) or (5.2) is not satised for any
i  n0. This implies that the high-quality technology cannot be sustained in equilibrium; we
refer to this phenomenon as one of governance crowding out.
Proposition 5 (Governance crowding out): The high-quality technology cannot be sustained in
equilibrium, that is, n
00
= 0, in an industry with moral-hazard , if  > 0 (where 0 is dened
in the Appendix II). Furthermore, lim
!0
0 = FL FH :
These observations imply that the quality of a countrys corporate governance system has
an impact on the choices of technology made by rms operating in its jurisdiction and thus on
the industrial structure of its economy.26 In particular, our model suggests that countries with
a low-quality of corporate governance system may not be able to sustain more e¢ cient rms in
capital intensive industries that are more exposed to moral hazard, such as, for example, the
high-technology and pharmaceutical sectors. Thus, these countries will be at a competitive dis-
advantage in developing such more advanced sectors. These are new and testable predictions.27
6. Governance and the Structure of Financial Systems
6.1. Governance and Bank Financing
Banks can reduce the agency costs of debt by monitoring rms and thus mitigating the entre-
preneurs incentives to take excessive risks (see, for example, Diamond , 1991, among others).
Assume now that the economy is endowed also by competitive banks and that, by incurring a
xed monitoring cost, cb, a bank can decrease the extent of entrepreneurial moral hazard. The
benet of bank nancing is to lower the minimum equity that a rm must maintain from  to,
say, , thus reducing the agency costs of equity and increasing debt capacity. The monitoring
cost is charged up front to the entrepreneur when he borrows from the bank, increasing the cost
26Note that Proposition 5 implies that when the e¢ ciency di¤erences between technologies become small,
 ! 0, and when  ! FL=FH ; 0 approaches zero. In this case, the high-quality technology is never chosen in
equilibrium
27 In Appendix I, we provide evidence consistent with our models prediction. Specically, in Table A1, part
c, we show that economies with higher investor protection are also characterized by a better developed high-
technology sector.
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of entering a market.
Firms may seek nancing either from investors, in the form of publicly traded debt, or equity
as before, or by borrowing from a bank. It is easy to see that bank debt is preferable to publicly
traded debt when the savings in terms of lower agency cost of equity (due to the lower minimum
equity that is necessary with bank nancing) is greater than the monitoring cost, cb, that is
cb < (1  )(1  ): (6.1)
Note also that the use of bank debt, by reducing the moral hazard problem, may allow entry
of rms that otherwise would not obtain nancing and be excluded from the market. By direct
examination of the entry condition (3.20), it is easy to see that if
 >  + cb; (6.2)
that is, if cb < (1  ), some marginal rms will now be able to raise required capital by
using bank nancing and enter the market.
These observations have several implications. Since condition (6.1) is more likely to be
satised when  is large, rms operating in countries characterized by bad corporate governance
are more likely to be bank nanced. This also implies that the nancial system in such countries
is likely to be dominated by (or to make a greater us of) banks. Similarly, rms in industries
characterized by greater moral hazard are more likely to use bank nancing rather than publicly
traded debt, since (6.1) and (6.2) are more likely to be satised when  is large. Finally, when
(6.1) fails but (6.2) holds, more e¢ cient rms do not benet from bank nancing and are nanced
by traded debt, while less e¢ cient ones (the marginal rms) use bank nancing in order to enter
the market - a prediction consistent with the ndings in Robb and Robinson (2009).28
6.2. Governance, Financial Innovation and Entry
Firmsincentives to take excessive risks, that arise from debt nancing, can be curbed by the
use of convertible securities, such as convertible debt or warrants (see, e.g., Green, 1984). This
means that nancial innovations, by facilitating rms ability to raise capital, could lead to
28Thus, our model provides an explanation for the choice between bank and publicly traded debt di¤erent from
the one discussed, for example, in Diamond (1991) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).
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more entry, reduce industrys concentration and spur competition. In this section we show
that the interaction of the agency costs of equity with the risk shifting problem limits the
ability of convertible securities to curb the risk shifting problem. In fact, the use of convertible
instruments may exacerbate both the risk shifting problem and the agency cost of equity, and
need not generate new entry into an industry.
Proposition 6 (Financial innovation and industry structure): There exists a  < 1 such that if
 <   1 the high-quality technology is chosen in equilibrium by all rms, the number of rms
entering the industry is n, and while the more e¢ cient rms may use convertible debt, the least
e¢ cient ones (with indices su¢ ciently close to n) use only straight debt. Furthermore, there
exists  < 1, such that  = 0 for  > .
Proposition 6 implies that when the quality of corporate governance is low (high  ), market
concentration is not a¤ected by the use of convertible bonds. The e¤ectiveness of convertible
debt as a tool to deter insiders from excessive risk taking depends on the fraction of equity
owned by the rms insiders. Remember that in our model entrepreneurs rst appropriate a
fraction  of the cash ow to equity, that is the rms cash ow net of payments to creditors,
and then receive a fraction of the residual cash ow in proportion to the fraction of equity they
own.29 Conversion of the convertible bonds a¤ects insiders incentives in two opposing ways.
First, conversion removes debt, which increases the cash ow to equity and allows the insiders
to appropriate a greater fraction of their rms cash ow. Therefore, conversion of convertible
debt eliminates the disciplinary role of debt. Second, conversion of the bonds requires the rm
to issue new shares and dilutes existing shareholders, including the insiders, providing the usual
deterrent to excessive risk taking (as in Green 1984). If the rst cash ow e¤ect dominates the
dilution e¤ect, the presence of convertible debt promotes risk taking.
Whether convertible debt promotes or deters risk taking depends on the level of insiders
equity. More e¢ cient entrepreneurs have large equity stakes in their rms and therefore su¤er
from the potential dilution due to convertible debt. For these entrepreneurs, convertible debt
can be an e¤ective tool to reduce the risk shifting problem, increasing debt capacity and, thus,
reducing the agency cost of equity they su¤er. In contrast, the most ine¢ cient entrepreneurs
29Recall also that in our model rms cash ow can be observed by outsiders (i.e., the bondholders) even if
only a fraction 1   of the cash ows is contractible.
23
can enter the market only if they raise large amount of outside nancing and, thus, retain very
little equity. For these entrepreneurs the cash ow e¤ect dominates the dilution e¤ect when 
is su¢ ciently large. Interestingly, for these entrepreneurs, the use of convertible debt a¤ects
the risk shifting problem so that it promotes risk taking. This implies that, in equilibrium,
entrepreneurs with less ine¢ cient technologies (large i) do not issue convertible debt and use
only straight debt. These observations imply that availability of convertible debt (and other
option-like instruments) does not induce any additional entry in countries with poor corporate
governance regimes (high ).
7. The Choice of Governance Systems
The quality of the corporate governance system and the level of investor protection in an economy
need not be xed, as we have assumed so far, but may be determined endogenously. In this
section we examine the incentives to improve the quality of the governance system at the level
of individual rms as well as at the level of the overall economy.
7.1. Governance as a Competitive Tool
Companies can use the corporate governance system as a competitive tool and choose the quality
of their corporate governance as part of their cost minimization e¤orts (see, for example, Allen
and Gale, 2000). In this section we examine the possibility that a rm, by sustaining additional
costs, can improve the quality of its own governance system beyond the level determined by
its legal environment (i.e., its legal jurisdiction). Examples of this type of rm specic activ-
ities include improving corporate disclosures, hiring highly reputable (and, presumably, more
expensive) independent directors, or changing corporate charters in ways that protect minority
shareholders.
Assume now that the entrepreneur i can, at t = 0, by exerting a level of e¤ort ei  0; reduce
the fraction of cash ow to equity that he can appropriate to (1  ei), but at a cost equal to




where k  0:30 Thus, we can still interpret the parameter  as representing the overall quality of
30Note that this cost function has the attractive properties that the cost is zero if e¤ort is zero, and that
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the corporate governance system of the legal jurisdiction where the rm operates. In addition,
entrepreneurs can exert e¤ort and improve the quality of the governance system of their rms
so as to further reduce the diversion factor to (1   ei). Propositions 7 and 8 characterize the
equilibrium for di¤erent values of k. In both cases, entry to an industry occurs until the marginal
entrepreneurs payo¤, net of the costs from improving governance, equals zero.
Proposition 7 (Endogenous governance): If k  k1 (dened in Appendix II), there exists an
equilibrium where the rst n entrepreneurs enter the market, with n < n < nc: In this case,




(1  ) ; (7.2)
and the optimal governance that thus emerges in an industry is
̂

 (1  e) =
s
k
(1  ) : (7.3)
Exerting e¤ort to improve the quality of a rms governance system reduces the agency
cost of equity and allows entrepreneurs to raise more capital in the equity market. Thus, by
producing better governance, rms relax their nancing constraint, promoting entry. If the cost
of producing better governance is not too high, that is, when k  k1, all entrepreneurs exert the
optimal e¤ort, e. Industry concentration, n, is determined by the condition that the payo¤
to the marginal entrant equals the entrepreneurss cost of producing good governance.
Better corporate governance allows marginal entrepreneurs to raise more capital, leading to
additional entry, n > n. Thus, the ability of rms to improve their own corporate governance
promotes entry, and takes the equilibrium closer to the competitive one, but (since e¤ort is
costly) it cannot fully restore the perfectly competitive outcome, n < nc.
In equilibrium, there is a industry-specic level of corporate governance quality, ̂

. Direct
examination of (7.2) reveals that e¤ort to improve a rms corporate governance is greatest in
industries with high moral hazard (greater ), and in economies characterized by worse corpo-
rate governance (greater ). Thus, industries more exposed to moral hazard (greater ) are also
characterized in equilibrium by better governance (lower, ̂

). Also, rms located in countries
obtaining a perfect corporate governance system is prohibitively costly.
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endowed with worse corporate governance regimes are characterized by better corporate gover-
nance systems at the rm level. Thus corporate governance at rm level and country level are
"substitutes."31
Following a procedure similar to the one adopted in Section 4, it is easy to verify that better
rm level corporate governance is also associated with greater industry concentration, lower
leverage, and greater protability. This implies that entrepreneurs in more concentrated in-
dustries have greater incentives to improve the quality of the corporate governance system at
their rms.32 It also implies a positive correlation between the quality of a rms corporate
governance and its protability, and a negative correlation between the quality of a rms gov-
ernance system and its leverage: rms with better governance are more protable, have a less
concentrated ownership structure and a lower leverage.33
If the cost of e¤ort k is relatively large (that is, when k > k1), some marginal entrepreneurs
may not be able to raise the necessary capital to enter the market if they exert the optimal level
of e¤ort e. In this case, marginal entrepreneurs are willing to increase their level of e¤ort
beyond e to relax the nancing constraint and, thus, secure entry in the market.
Proposition 8 (Competitive governance): Let k > k1. There exists an equilibrium where the
rst n̂; where nc > n̂ > n; entrepreneurs enter the market and the marginal entrepreneur exerts
greater e¤ort level, ên̂ > e. Furthermore, @êi@ > 0 and
@êi
@ > 0, for all i  n̂.
Proposition 8 suggests there are heterogenous levels of corporate governance quality also
within an industry as entrepreneurs with lower e¢ ciency levels (higher i) exert a greater level of
31This is consistent with Klapper and Love (2004), who nd that rm-level corporate governance provisions
matter more in countries with weak legal environments, which suggests that rms can partially compensate for
ine¤ective laws and enforcement by establishing good corporate governance practices at rm level and providing
credible investor protection. In contrast, Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2009) show that rm and
country levels of corporate governance are positively correlated, suggesting a degree of complementarity between
rm and country levels of corporate governance. Their result can be reconciled with our models predictions, if
we assume that the cost of producing good governance, k, is negatively correlated with countrys overall corporate
governance quality, as suggested in Doidge, Karoly, and Stulz (2007).
32This observation is consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2008), who nd that rms in less competitive
industries benet more from good governance.
33These predictions are consistent with the ndings of Litov (2005), which shows a negative relation between
rms leverage and the quality of its corporate governance.
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e¤ort, êi. This implies that the marginal entrepreneurs, that is, those who need more capital to
enter the market, will adopt a better corporate governance system than the more e¢ cient ones.
It also implies that rms with greater insidersownership are characterized by worse corporate
governance.34
7.2. The Politics of Corporate Governance
Agents within an economy respond di¤erently to changes in their countrys corporate gover-
nance legislation. For example, investors always prefer (ex-post) better corporate governance
as this raises the value of their claims, as in Shleifer and Wolfenson (2002) and Bebchuk and
Neeman (2009). Potential entrants in a market, i 2 (n; nc], always (weakly) prefer better cor-
porate governance, as this may allow them to enter a market and thus exploit a positive prot
opportunity.
The quality of the corporate governance system has, instead, an ambiguous impact (in equi-
librium) on the rms that are able to enter the market (that is, for i 2 [0; n]), and therefore on
their controlling shareholdersincentives to lobby in favour (or against) an improvement of legal
environment of the economy. Substituting from (3.20) into (3.16), we obtain that entrepreneur





  FH   i  (1  ); for i  n. (7.4)
From (7.4) it is easy to see that the quality of the governance system has two opposing e¤ects
on the these entrepreneurswelfare. First, corporate governance a¤ects the amount of private
benets, , that an entrepreneur can extract from his rm. However, since the extraction of
private benets is ine¢ cient ( < 1), and securities are fairly priced so that entrepreneurs fully
internalize this ine¢ ciency, entrepreneurs su¤er in equilibrium from bad governance. This can
be seen by noting that, holding n constant, V i is decreasing in . Second, from (3.8), the
34These predictions are consistent with Bruno and Claessens (2007), which nds that companies that rely
more heavily on external nancing have better corporate governance. Durnev and Kim (2005), on the other
hand, nds that better rm level corporate governance is associated with greater growth opportunities, greater
needs for external nancing, and more concentrated cash ow rights. In addition, these relations are stronger
in countries with poor investor protection, suggesting again that rms respond to poor legal environments by
establishing e¢ cient governance practices at rm level.
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quality of corporate governance limits the amount of capital that an entrepreneur can raise, and
thus a¤ects entry. In this way, by limiting competition, bad corporate governance increases the
equilibrium payo¤ of the entrepreneurs who can raise nancing and enter the market. Thus, for
the inframarginal entrepreneurs (i  n), the net e¤ect of the quality of the corporate governance
system is ambiguous.35
Proposition 9 (Entrepreneurspreferences for good governance): For i 2 [0; n), we have that






Furthermore, @2V i =@
2 > 0, @@ < 0 and
@
@ > 0.
Proposition 9 shows that the more e¢ cient entrepreneurs, i 2 [0; n), benet from poor
corporate governance as long as the extraction of private benets is not too costly, that is, when
 > . If the extraction of private benets is very ine¢ cient, that is, if  < , the benets
of poor corporate governance, that are due to reduced entry, are not su¢ cient to compensate
entrepreneurs for the e¢ ciency losses of private benets extraction. Note also that entrepreneurs
are more likely to prefer good governance (that is, the threshold level  is greater) when the
size of the product market, , is larger. This happens because in larger markets (for a given
level of corporate governance quality), more rms enter the market and the impact of corporate
governance on industry concentration is smaller.36 These observations imply that entrepreneurs
are more likely to prefer good governance either when they operate in larger economies (greater
), or when the legal system of their economy makes the appropriation of rmscash ow more
di¢ cult and, thus, less e¢ cient (lower ).
It is also interesting to note that entrepreneurs(equilibrium) utility, V i , is a convex function
of the quality of the corporate governance system, . This implies that entrepreneurs may
35Note that the ambiguity of  on entrepreneurspreferences for good governance is the result of the presence
of e¢ ciency di¤erence between technologies. To see this, note that if entrepreneurs are endowed with equally
e¢ cient technologies (that is,  = 0), from (7.4), we have that
V i  ; for i  n;
and all entrepreneurs, in equilibrium, have a strict preference for a corporate governance system of lower quality,
as in Perotti and Volpin (2005).
36This can be seen by verifying that the elasticity of entry, "(n; j), is decreasing in .
28
have a preference for extremecorporate governance regimes. In other words, entrepreneurs
expected utility may show a local maximum for regimes that have either a very high or a
very low-quality corporate governance system, . This observation suggests that entrepreneurs
operating in economies endowed with a corporate governance system of low-quality may have
little or no incentive (locally) to seek, or to lobby for, an improvement of the governance system
of their economy. Thus, such economies may be trappedin a low-quality governance state.37
Conversely, entrepreneurs operating in economies endowed with a corporate governance system
of high-quality may have a strong incentive to maintain, or even improve, the quality of the
governance system of their economy. This means that countries would segment themselves
two groups: those with a high-quality of corporate governance and those with low-quality,
with relatively little transition from one group to the other.38 These results are consistent
with the nding that, despite the trend towards increased globalization, there is little evidence
of convergence of corporate governance practices over time (see Palepu, Khanna, and Kogan,
2006).
7.3. Wealth and The Politics of Corporate Governance
The preference for good corporate governance is also a¤ected by the distribution of wealth in an
economy. Until now we have assumed that entrepreneurs have no initial wealth, W0 = 0, and
that they must raise all the capital they need from investors: Our model can easily be extend
to the case where entrepreneurs are endowed with some wealth, W0 > 0. It is easy to see that
if the entrepreneurs wealth is not too large, the resulting equilibrium is the same as that in the
basic model, with the exception that F 0H = FH  W0 replaces FH in all equations.
Wealth a¤ects entrepreneurspreference for good governance in di¤erent ways. First, greater
wealth may increase the number of entrepreneurs for whom Assumption A2 is violated, and
thus 1   i  . Such rms need to raise less capital from outside investors and, thus, their
entrepreneurs have no incentive to divert cash ow to equity, avoiding the e¢ ciency loss from
37 In a similar vein, Mork, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) suggest that low income countries appear to be
"trapped" in a weak property rights regime with poor governance and economic entrenchment.
38This result reects the endogenous level of debt nancing, and thus the endogenous level of e¢ ciency losses
from bad corporate governance. In countries with bad corporate governance rms are more debt nanced, and
thus the e¢ ciency losses from further reducing the level of corporate governce are lower.
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cash ow diversion. This means that the controlling shareholders of these rms do not internalize
the e¢ ciency gains from improved corporate governance; rather, they always prefer a corporate
governance system of poorer quality in order to deter entry, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales
(2003). Since wealthy families have a large role of in many countries (see e.g., Morck, Wolfenson
and Yeung, 2005), they may form an important interest group shaping countries corporate
governance systems.39
Interestingly, however, an increase in wealth makes those entrepreneurs that have an incentive
to divert cash ow to themselves, that is, for whom 1   i <  , more likely to prefer good
corporate governance. This happens because greater wealth allows more entrepreneurs to enter
a market, reducing the impact of corporate governance on industry concentration. Because of
this, greater wealth makes it more likely that the e¢ ciency gains from good governance dominate
the benets from deterring entry to entrepreneurs. This also implies that an exogenous reduction
of entrepreneurial wealth in an economy may cause a shift in the entrepreneurspreference in
favor of bad corporate governance.40
8. Financial Market Liberalization, Governance, and Growth
In this last section, we modify our basic model and examine explicitly the impact of nancial
market liberalizations on the real economy and thus, ultimately, growth. Liberalizations a¤ect
nancial markets in several important ways. For example, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2009)
show that equity market liberalizations a¤ect stock market liquidity and equity prices. To
capture the e¤ect of nancial liberalizations on liquidity, we assume that outside investors require
a liquidity premium on their equity investments. In this spirit, we replace constraint (3.8) in
39Note that in this case wealth concentration promotes further wealth inequality if the more wealthy entrepre-
neurs are able to successfully lobby for corporate governance of low-quality that deters entry of new entrepreneurs.
40This observation is consistent with the nding in Perotti and von Thadden (2006), who argue that the
availability of a large middle class wealth seems to have played a large role in shaping the nancial systems
and corporate governance regimes adopted by various developed countries in Europe and North America. They
provide evidence that the countries where the nancial holdings of the middle class were devastated by hyper-
ination after First World War later moved away from market governance toward bank, family or state control.
The countries that avoided this destruction of middle class wealth, on the other hand, coincide with those that
we today classify as market oriented economies.
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the basic model with
Si  E0i(1  )(1  )maxfXTi (p; i (Bi)) Bi; 0g; (8.1)
where the parameter  > 0 represents a "liquidity discount" that investors require in the equity
market only.41 Inequality (8.1) implies that, due to the liquidity discount, one dollar of cash
ow is only worth 1    dollars to outside investors. Furthermore, to capture in a simple way
the benecial e¤ect of competition on aggregate output, we now assume total demand in any
industry is not constant, but is a decreasing function of the average price level in the industry,
that is  = 0=~p, where 0 is a constant. For ease of exposition, we also set c = 0.
Proposition 10 (Equity market liberalizations): Let    + (1   ),   c and   c
(where c and 












All entrepreneurs choose the high-quality technology and produce output qi =
q
0




n . High-quality industry output, given by n
q =
p
n0, is increasing in n and
the equilibrium number of rms, n, is decreasing in . Furthermore, dening the elasticity of
entry with respect to , as "(n; ) 










Proposition 10 shows that equity market liberalizations, associated with a decline in , lead to
entry of new rms in the economy, which in turn leads to higher output and thus greater growth.
Furthermore, the elasticity of entry to the liquidity discount  is decreasing in the size of the
industry, 0, and increasing in the level of industry moral hazard, . This implies that nancial
liberalizations (that is, a decrease in ) have greater impact on entry in small industries and in
industries more exposed to moral hazard. Finally, the elasticity of entry to  is decreasing in ,
which means that the e¤ect of nancial market liberalization is more pronounced in economies
characterized by high levels of investor protection.
41We focus here on the e¤ect of nancial liberalizations on the equity markets, but our analysis can easily be
extended to the case in which the credit market is a¤ected as well.
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The prediction that the number of rms increases after equity market liberalizations is con-
sistent with the nding in Rajan and Zingales (1998). This paper shows that the positive e¤ect of
equity market liberalization on growth occurs predominantly through an increase in the number
of rms. Furthermore, Gupta and Yuan (2009) nd that following equity market liberalization,
the number of rms increases in industries that are characterized by low entry barriers. Closely
related is also Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblatt (2005), which nds that equity market liberaliza-
tions increase economic growth, especially in countries characterized by high levels of investor
protection.
Financial markets liberalization also a¤ects the industrial structure of the economy. If the
low-quality technology is sustainable in equilibrium (as in Section 5.1) nancial liberalization,
by facilitating the use of equity, promotes the adoption of the high-quality technology versus
the low-quality one.
Proposition 11 (Corporate governance, technology choice and liberalization): Let  2
(c ; FL=FH) and  < 





> 0 and 

> 0 are dened Appendix II). In
equilibrium n0 > n entrepreneurs enter the market and:
i) the rst n
00 2 (0; n0) choose the high-quality technology, and raise D of debt and FH;i D
of equity;
ii) the remaining n0   n00 > 0 choose the low-quality technology and nance their xed




(increasing) in : Total industry output of high-quality goods is decreasing in :
Financial market liberalizations promote the adoption of the high-quality technology through
two e¤ects. First, by relaxing the nancing constraint in the equity market, given by (8.1), lib-
eralizations allow additional marginal entrepreneurs to enter an industry with the high-quality
technology. Second, liberalizations reduce the cost of equity for incumbents and make the high-
quality technology more attractive relative to the low-quality one. This implies that, by pro-
moting high-quality technologies, nancial market liberalizations spur productivity and growth.
Furthermore, these e¤ects are particularly strong in equity intensive industries, such as the high-
technology sector, and in countries with high levels of investor protection. These predictions
help explain the ndings in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblatt (2009), who document increases in
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investment e¢ ciency (and productivity) following nancial market liberalizations, especially in
countries endowed with more advanced nancial system (and, thus, presumably a greater level
of investor protection).
Finally, nancial market liberalizations a¤ect entrepreneurspreferences for good governance
and their incentives to lobby for a better governance system. Proposition 9 is modied as follows
(where V i denotes entrepreneur is equilibrium payo¤).
Proposition 12 (Financial liberalization and entrepreneurspreferences for good governance):








@ < 0, and ii)
@2V i
@@ > 0 .
Proposition 12 shows that nancial market liberalizations a¤ect entrepreneurspreferences
for good governance in two ways. First, inequality (i) implies that greater liquidity (that is,
a smaller ) increases the threshold level  below which entrepreneurspayo¤ increases with
better governance, e¤ectively enlarging the set over which entrepreneurs equilibrium payo¤s
increases with better corporate governance. Second, inequality (ii) implies that entrepreneurs
in countries with better corporate governance, that is, when  < , benet more from an
improvement of the corporate governance system when  is lower.42 These properties suggests
that equity market liberalizations can make entrepreneurs more likely to benet from, and thus
to be in favor of, better corporate governance. This means that entrepreneurs have stronger
incentives to lobby for an improvement of the corporate governance of their economies and,
thus, that nancial liberalizations may be followed also by nancial reforms. These results are
consistent with the ndings that the countrieslegislations and institutions promoting investor
protection on average improve following nancial market liberalizations. For example, Chinn
and Ito (2006) nd that nancial liberalizations spur a countrys equity market development
(but only if a threshold level of legal development has been attained).43




becomes more negative when 
decreases.
43 In a similar vein, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that
an institutional environment promoting investment has a rst-order e¤ect on long-term growth.
33
9. Conclusions
The main message of our paper is that the quality of the corporate governance system of an
economy is an important determinant of its industrial and nancial structure. We suggest
that the quality of corporate governance a¤ects both industry concentration and the rms
nancial structure. We show that countries characterized by poor corporate governance and
low levels of investor protection have less competitive economies and have rms with greater
leverage and more concentrated equity ownership. We also argue that corporate governance may
a¤ect rmstechnology choices and in this way economic growth. Our results also suggest that
entrepreneurs may locally prefer worse corporate governance in countries already characterized
by bad corporate governance, and better corporate governance in countries already endowed with
good corporate governance. These results suggest that the di¤erent legal systems that support
di¤erent economic structures may also be favoured by entrepreneurs, providing a reason for why
such di¤erences in corporate governance regimes across countries may persist over time.
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In Table A1 below, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the level of investor protection
in an economy (a measure of corporate governance) and its industrial and financial structure. The main source
of our data is Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 by Michael Porter, Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Klaus
Schwab. The report provides for a large sample of countries an index of the strenght of investor protection,
which was earlier introduced by World Bank (Doing business, 2007). In addition, it contains country level
indicators, based on executive surveys, related to the ease of equity financing from local markets and the
intensity of local competition. To supplement this data, we have collected from Thomson Financial Database
country level data on the percentage of high-tech firms, calculated using equity market capitalizations.
Finally, we have obtained from Allen al. (2007) data on the importance of bank debt financing. The table is
constructed as follows: we first rank the sample of countries into quartiles based on the levels of investor
protection, with I = best and IV = worst. Then, we present the averages and medians for (a) ease of financing
from local equity markets; (b) intensity of local competition; (c) percentage of market capitalization of high-
tech firms; (d) bank credit to market capitalization ratio.
Table A1: Industrial Structure, Finance and Investor Protection
   Investor protection categories (I best)
   sample size I II III IV Difference I-IV t statistic
Ease of financing from local equity markets
Average 123 5.12 4.69 4.04 3.89 1.23 5.12 ***
Median 5.30 4.90 3.95 3.80 1.50
Intensity of local competition
Average 123 5.21 4.93 4.70 4.55 0.65 3.83 ***
Median 5.40 5.10 4.60 4.50 0.90
Percentage of market capitalization of high-tech firms
Average 60 17.7 % 15.8 % 10.0 % 9.2 % 8.46 % 1.84 *
Median 14.3 % 10.1 % 7.5 % 5.8 % 8.47 %
Bank credit to market capitalization ratio
Average 84 1.85 8.62 7.01 4.90 (3.05) -2.87 ***
Median 1.37 2.87 2.84 3.63 (2.26)
* Significant at 10% confidence level
** Significant at 5% confidence level
*** Significant at 1% confidence level
Sources: The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 by Porter et. al. (2008), Thomson Datastream, IMF Global Financial Stability Reports and Allen et al. (2007).
1. Investor protection is a measure based on combination of Extent of disclosure index (transparency of transactions), Extent of director liability index (liability of self dealing),
and Ease of shareholder suit index (shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct). Original source, World Bank, Doing business 2007: How to reform.
2. Ease of financing through local equity markets measure is based on an executive survey, where the respondents evaluated: Raising money through local equity markets is (1=
nearly impossible, 7 = quite possible for a good company).
3. Intensity of local competition measure is based on an executive survey, where the respondents evaluated: Competition in the local market is (1= limited in most industries and
price-cutting is rare, 7 = intensive in most industries as market leadership changes over time).
4. Definition of high tech–sector was created using the sector descriptions in Thompson Datastream. From 47 industries we selected the industries that belong to our definition
of the high tech sector on the basis of the industry average R&D to Sales-ratios in the US data. High tech sector includes the industries with the highest ratios, and which
form roughly 25% of the number of firms and market capitalization in the US. The firms in the industries selected correspond to 22% in terms of amount and to 21% in terms
of market value in the US. Our high tech industries are: Alternative Energy, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, Health Care Equipment & Service, Industrial Transportation,
Software & Computer Services and Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology. Our country figures are the proportions of total market capitalization of the firms belonging to the
high tech sector. Our sample is based on more than 46.000 companies for which we obtained the relevant data. In order to minimize the effect of errors in the data and to
eliminate from our sample international firms whose primary listing is outside their home country we required that the indicated primary market matches with the currency in
which the data was reported in.
5. Bank Credit / Market capitalization figures are from Allen et al. (2007) and correspond to averages over the period of 1976-2004.
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Appendix II
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking as given n and ep, the rst order condition to (3.1) leads to
(3.12). This implies that the equilibrium level of cash ow to a rm i is
XTi = X












;  i(Bi))  FH;i   (1  )maxfXTi (p;  i(Bi)) Bi; 0g

(A2)





;  i; i):
Since the low-quality technology is not sustainable, in equilibrium only rms that are expected
(and have the incentive) to choose the high-quality technology enter. This leads to the incentive
compatibility condition (3.18). From (A2) it is easy to see that entrepreneurs rst issue debt up
to debt capacity D, after which will issue equity. Given (3.19) the maximum amount of equity
that the marginal entrepreneur with cash ow XT can issue is Sn = (1   ). This implies
that n is determined by




   = FH;n = FH + n; (A3)
giving (3.11). Inframarginal entrepreneurs will issue an amount of equity that is just su¢ cient
to cover the xed cost FH;i giving (3.13). Thus, the fraction of equity sold to outside investors,
i, is Si =(1  ), giving (3.15). The payo¤ to the marginal entrepreneur, who given (A3) sells
all his shares to obtain entry, is . The payo¤ to inframarginal entrepreneurs is thus (3.16).
Finally, from (3.15), it is easy to see that 1  i <  for all i < n if
  c 
n
(1  ) : (A4)
In addition note that no additional entrepreneur with i > n can enter when ( n ) < FL+ n
,
that is, when






The proof is concluded by noting that (A5) implies that
Vi =  + (n
   i) > ( 
n
)   FL   i (A6)
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and, thus, all entrepreneurs that enter the market prefer to adopt the high-quality technology
rather than the low-quality one.
Proof of Proposition 2. The rst result follows immediately from Proposition 1 and implicit







The sign of @ D@ follows from direct di¤erentiation of




follows from the rst equality in (3.13) and the previous result that @ D@ > 0: The sign of
@EMi
@






(1  )  ; (A8)
















i¤ i < ic(; )  n   (1 )22
n3+
. The ine¢ ciency of low-quality technology implies that n >
ic(; ) > 0: To see this note that FH < FL implies
22
n2
= 2 (FH + n
 + ) > FL >
 (FH   FL)
(1  ) = : (A10)
Finally, (4.2) is obtained by substituting (A7) into " =














which is increasing in  (since, in the proof of Proposition 3, we will show that n is decreasing
in ).
Proof of Proposition 3. The rst result that @n

@ < 0 follows immediately from Proposition 1
and implicit function di¤erentiation of (3.11). The sign of @S

i
@ follows from direct di¤erentiation
of Si in (3.13) and the result that
@n
@ < 0. The sign of
@ D
@ then follows from the rst equality
in (3.13). The sign of @E
M
i
@ follows from direct di¤erentiation of E
M
i = (1  ) . The result




Proof of Proposition 4. The low-quality technology is sustainable in equilibrium if









  FL   n > 0: (A12)
When (A12) holds, if the rst n rms choose the high-quality technology, some additional
marginal rms can enter the market by adopting the low-quality technology. Let fn0; n00g be
a candidate equilibrium in which n0 is the total number of rms in the industry and n00 2
[0; n0) is the number of rms that choose the high-quality technology. Note rst that, in the
candidate equilibrium, rms with high-quality technology produce ~qi =

n00+(n0 n00) , and sell
their production at a price ~pi = c+





n00 + (n0   n00)
2
: (A13)




n00 + (n0   n00)
2
  : (A14)
In equilibrium, rms selecting the high-quality technology nance D with debt and FH;i   D
with equity. The remaining n0   n00 > 0 entrepreneurs who enter the market produce with
the low-quality technology, and with probability  can produce superior quality goods in the
quantity ~qi . Furthermore, these rms can be nanced entirely with debt; thus they borrow
Di = FL + n
0 of debt with a face value Bi = FL+n
0
 , and repurchase shares for D

i   FL;i.







n00 + (n0   n00)
2
= FL + n
0
: (A15)
Furthermore two of the three conditions bind, (A15) and either (5.1) or (5.2). Consider two
cases: First, if   , it is easy to verify that (5.1) implies (5.2) for all i  0 if
(1  )n00 + (  ) + FL   FH  0; (A16)








This can be used in (A15) or (5.1) to substitute for either n0 or n00 to verify that n00 is decreasing
in , while n0 is increasing in . Substituting for n0 from (A17) into (5.1) and setting n00 = 0
gives that n00  0 if and only if   1; where 1 is dened implicitely by

 (FH   FL + 1)
2
= FH + 1: (A18)
Second, if  < , (A16) holds for   2; where 2 is dened by
2 =
FL   FH
(  ) : (A19)
Let  = I>1 + I<min(1; 2): Note that our assumption that FL > FH implies that
 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: When   ; or when  < ; but 1  2, let 0 = : When  < ,
but 1 > 2; (A15) and (5.2) hold as an equality for small enough n
00. Solving for n00 using









1A2   (FH   FL)  (1  )3 = 0: (A20)




: The result regarding the limit when  ! 0
follows from (A18) since in the limit 1 < 2 when  < :
Proof of Proposition 6: Convertible debt must be structured so that it is converted if and
only if the entrepreneur chooses the risky technology and the output is of high-quality (otherwise
it would identical to equity). We will show that if  is large enough, convertible debt will not
be adopted by the marginal entrepreneur. Note rst that with convertible debt the incentive
compatibility constraint for entrepreneur i is











+ FH   FL

; (A21)
where i 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of shares obtained by convertible debt holders through conversion.
The proof is by contradiction: we rst assume that the marginal entrepreneur, n, can by
selecting convertible debt avoid risk shifting, and then we show that this leads to a contradiction.
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We now show that, for the marginal entrepreneur, the maximal incentives to select the safe
technology occur (that is, the incentive compatibility condition (A21) is more easily satised)
when i = 0 and Bi = FH;i: Note the R.H.S of (A21) is decreasing in i, which means that i
should be as large as possible. To prevent debt holders from converting if the safe technology is






















2  Bii (1  )
1A : (A23)
First, consider the case that i > 0: Substituting for i; the L.H.S. of equation (A21) becomes




  FH;i +Bi (1  ) ; (A24)
which is an increasing function of Bi: Consider next the R.H.S. of equation (A21): if i = 1; it
is independent of Bi; if i < 1, from (A22) it can be written as

"












+ FH   FL

=














+ FH   FL

: (A25)
















2  Bi (1  ) :
This means that, for the marginal entrepreneur, n, (A25) reaches its minimum at Bi = FH;i.
Thus, for i = n; we only have to consider the case where Bi = FH;i and i = 0: In this case,
the incentive compatibility condition (A21) becomes






















we have that (A21) becomes

























+ FH   FL

: (A28)
We now show that for the nth rm this condition cannot hold for large : First note that for




2  FH;n = : Second, noting that in equilibrium





+ FH   FL

=  + D: (A29)




2    >   n 2 (1  ) given (3.19). Using these
results and (A3), the incentive compatibility constraint (A28) for the marginal entrepreneur n
becomes























1   g < 1: (A31)






> 0; for large enough ; i.e.;   ;  = 0. Numerical examples can be used to
show that the incentive compatibility constraint (A21) with convertible debt can hold as a strict
inequality for more e¢ cient entrepreneurs, when the number of rms is n and the face value
of their convertible debt is B: This implies that those rms can increase their debt, and hence
the payo¤ to the entrepreneur by using convertible debt.





XTi ( i)  FH;i   (1  ei)(1  )maxfXTi ( i) Bi; 0g

  C (k; ei) (A32)
subject to
 i = arg max
 i2fH;Lg
E1[ + (1  i)(1  )]maxfXTi ( i) Bi; 0g: (A33)
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With the given cost function for e¤ort, assuming that A1 and A2 hold, we can rewrite the













1   . (A35)
Under our assumption that k  k1; the rst order condition with respect to ei gives the optimal




(1  ) : (A36)









  FH   n   2
p
k(1  ) + k = 0;
implying that n is implicitly determined by
n =
q
FH + n + 2
p
k(1  )   k
> n: (A38)
To see that n > n; note that
 > 2
p
k   k > 2
p











We now need to show that, by exerting e¤ort e; the marginal entrepreneur is able to raise
nancing, that is  
n
2
  FH   n   (1  e)  0: (A41)
Using (A37), it is easy to check that (A41) is veried when
ke(1  e) 1  (1  e); (A42)
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that is, from (A36), when
k  k1 
(1  2)2
1     (1  ): (A43)
The proof is concluded by noting that A1 holds with the previous denition of c and redening







Proof of Proposition 8: In this case, the nancing constraint (A41) fails with n rms in the
market. Hence, less rms enter and at the e¤ort level e all entering rms would have strictly
positive payo¤s. This implies that for some marginal rms (who otherwise would be left out)
it pays to exert an amount of e¤ort êi > e in order to obtain entry. For these rms, êi is set
su¢ ciently high to raise the necessary funds to successfully enter the market, that isbn2   FH   i  (1  êi) = 0: (A44)
The number of rms in this equilibrium, n̂, is again determined by the condition that the
marginal entrepreneur earns zero expected prots. That is, by
n̂
2
  FH   n̂  (1  êbn)(1  )   kêbn(1  êbn) 1 = 0: (A45)
Substituting (A44) to (A45) gives
(1  ên̂)2   kêbn = 0 (A46)
=)






êbn = 0 (A47)
or ên̂ =




2 (0; 1): (A48)
From (A44) and the rst order condition for e¤ort (A36) it is easy to see that for other rms




































which implies, given our previous results for e; and the fact that @n̂@ < 0 and
@n̂
@ < 0; as can
be veried using (A45), that these derivatives are positive also for other rms.
Proof of proposition 9: For i < n; the derivative of entrepreneur is payo¤ (3.16) with
respect to  is
@V i
@















2 > 0: (A53)








n (FH + n















n (FH + ) + 3
2 > 0: (A55)
Proof of Proposition 10: The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, and is only
sketched. Taking again n and ~p as given, entrepreneurs choosing the high-quality technology
set pi = 
0














This implies that debt capacity now is D = 
0
n   , where  is dened as before. Given that
the marginal entrepreneur now issues Sn = (1   )(1   ) of equity, using similar line of
reasoning as the one in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that n rms producing all with
the high-quality technology can enter the market, where n is the positive root of
n2 + (FH + )n  0 = 0; (A56)




it is easy to show (along the lines in the proof of Proposition
1) that all incumbents prefer to use the high-quality technology, and that there cannot be any
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entry of rms that use the low-quality technology when   c . Similarly, 1   i   for all
rms when   c  n













2 (1  ) @n@0
(FH + 2n + )



















FH + 2n + 
 




@ + (1  )
i
(FH + 2n + )
2 (A60)
=  
 (FH + 2n




@ + (1  )
i
(FH + 2n + )
2
=  
 (FH + 2n







(FH + 2n + )
2
=  
 (FH + 2n





(FH + 2n + )
2 < 0:
Proof of Proposition 11: The low-quality technology is sustainable in equilibrium if








  FL   n > 0: (A61)
When (A61) holds, as in the limiting case where  = 0; the rst n
00
rms choose the high-quality
technology and n0   n00 select the low quality technology. Equilibrium is determined by three




n00 + (n0   n00)

  (FH + n00)    0; (A62)
the condition that entrepreneurs prefer to raise FH;n00 , and select the high-quality technology,




n00 + (n0   n00)

  (FH   FL)  (   )  0: (A63)
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n00 + (n0   n00)

= FL + n
0: (A64)
Furthermore two of the three conditions bind, (A64) and either (A62) or (A63). (A63) is implied
by (A62) when
(1  )n00 + (   ) + FL   FH > 0 (A65)
This is satised when
(  ) + FL   FH
 (1  )   
  : (A66)


> 0 when (   ) + FL   FH > 0:As FL   FH > 0; there exists 

> 0 such that this
holds for all  < 

.




  FH   FL + 

: (A67)
This can be used in (A62) or (A64) to substitute for either n0 or n00 to verify that n00 is
decreasing in , while n0 is increasing in . The claim on total production can now be veried
as an increase in  must lead to a decrease in total output 0=ep as ep = q 0
n00+(n0 n00) ; which
increases by (A64) given the result that n0 increases in .
Proof of Proposition 12: Similarly as before, the payo¤ to entrepreneur i 2 [0; n], V i , is
V i =  + (n




=  + 
@n
@















The results (i) and (ii) now follow from @n

@ < 0 and
@n
@ < 0:
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